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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Fair Labor Standards Act-Belo Contracts-Hours Guaranteed and
Actually Worked
In the 1956 case of Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &
Ins. Co.' defendant was engaged in the casualty insurance business,
primarily the insuring of steam boilers, pressure vessels, and machinery.
The company employed some six hundred inspectors throughout the
United States. Their duties necessitated irregular hours of work,
usually fluctuating between thirty-five and fifty hours per week. The
company paid the inspectors under individual guaranteed wage con-
tracts which provided for an hourly rate of pay in excess of the statu-
tory minimum for the first forty hours in each workweek, time and
one-half for each hour over forty, and a weekly guarantee of an amount
equivalent to the sum payable if sixty hours were actually worked. It
was not contemplated that any inspector would have to work more than
sixty hours in any one workweek, and each inspector was required to
get special permission before doing so. Actually, only one-fourth of one
percent of the workweeks over a two-year period exceeded sixty hours.
The Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin the alleged violations of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 He maintained
that the guaranteed wage contract was invalid because the hours worked
did not exceed the hours guaranteed in a substantial number of work-
weeks. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
contract was valid under section 7(e) 3 of the FLSA.
The FLSA specifies in section 7(a) that an employee covered by
the act must be paid "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed" 4 for all hours worked in excess of
forty for any one workweek. Because of the multitudinous methods of
wage compensation used throughout the industries and trades covered
by the FLSA, the courts have refrained from giving "regular rate"
a rigid interpretation, but have consistently said that the rate the em-
constitutional provisions, one might suppose that the far-seeing barons who wrung
the Great Charter from King John at Runnymede were intent upon safeguarding
the twentieth century racketeer, gangster, kidnaper, gunman and corrupt political
leader in the prosecution of their sinister vocations. It ought to be possible to find
a way, by judicial interpretation, to use these constitutional provisions for the
protection of liberty without giving them such fanciful and far-fetched interpreta-
tions as to convert them into a weapon by which criminals can make war safely
upon organized society and its law-abiding members." Address by Judge Samuel
Seabury, ALI Annual Meeting, May 7, 1932.
1235 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
' Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.§ 201-19 (1952), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 204-06, 208, 210, 213, 216 (Supp. IV,
1957), hereinafter referred to as the FLSA or the act.
8Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(e), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(a), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(a) (1952).
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ployer and employee fix must be realistic and not artificial or fictitious.5
In seeking a method to stabilize wage costs and still comply with
the overtime provisions of section 7(a) of the act, some employers have
made guaranteed wage contracts with their employees. In their usual
form, these contracts provide a basic hourly rate with at least 150 per-
cent of the basic hourly rate for all hours in excess of forty. In addi-
tion, the contracts provide a fixed guaranteed salary per week, regard-
less of the number of hours worked up to a specified maximum. The
guaranteed wage is computed from the hourly rate and overtime rate
specified in the contract. No additional compensation is paid the em-
ployee unless the maximum hours are exceeded, and from that point
overtime is computed from the specified contractual rate.
The above type of contract was given a judicial test for the first time
in Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp.,6 where the employer, a newspaper
publisher, made contracts with some of his employees specifying a basic
hourly rate and time and one-half for overtime. The contract, in addi-
tion, provided the employees with a guarantee of a fixed income each
week comparable to fifty-four and one-half hours worked at the con-
tractual hourly rates. The contracts were in writing and whenever a
change was made in the guaranteed wage, a corresponding change was
made in the basic hourly rate. The United States Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, upheld the contracts as complying with the
FLSA. The majority noted that the contracts provided sectrity and
regularity of income for employees whose work necessitated irregular
hours, and said that when such a contractual arrangement proved
mutually satisfactory to employer and employee, "[W]e should not
upset it and approve an inflexible and artificial interpretation of the
Act which finds no support in its text and which as a practical matter
eliminates the possibility of steady income to employees with irregular
hours." 7
Guaranteed wage agreements since the Belo decision have generally
been referred to as "Belo" contracts. In three cases after Belo, the
Supreme Court rejected purported "Belo" contracts.8 In each case the
5 "But this freedom of contract does not include the right to compute the
regular rate in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so as to negate the
statutory purposes." Mitchell v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 235 U.S.
419, 424 (1945), quoting from Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37,
42 (1944).
316 U.S. 624 (1942).7Id. at 635.
'In Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944), the employees
were paid at a "regular rate" for one-half the working day and at an "overtime
rate" for the remaining one-half of the day. An employee would thus have to work
for eighty hours before he could complete forty hours of regular time and qualify
himself for full overtime. The Court said: "Even when wages exceed the mini-
mum ... the parties to the contract must respect the statutory policy of requiring
the employer to pay one and one-half times the regular hourly rate for all hours
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Court said that it was not overruling the Belo decision, but the effect
seemed to be that Belo was restricted to its particular facts. In 1947
the Administrator made an unsuccessful attempt to have the Belo decision
overruled in the case of Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.0
In that case, an oil well cementing company had Belo-type contracts
with its employees. The employees were paid a guaranteed wage which
would not be exceeded unless they worked eighty-four hours a week,
but it was shown that in twenty percent of the weeks worked, the
eighty-four hour week was in fact exceeded. The Court again found
a reasonable relationship between the hourly rate and the overtime paid,
and rejected the Administrator's contention that the regular rate should
be the quotient of the amount of the guarantee, divided by the number
of hours actually worked in each workweek. Thus, Belo was again
sustained.' 0
Although disappointed by the Court in his attempt to determine the
"regular rate" by taking the total guarantee and dividing it by the hours
worked in any given week and computing overtime with this rate as
the base, the Administrator sought a narrow construction of the Belo and
Halliburton cases. He felt justified in advocating as the test for the
validity of Belo contracts a rule which would require that the hours
guaranteed must be exceeded in a "substantial number of workweeks."
He reasoned that only if the guaranteed hours are exceeded could the
regular rate be put into actual operation. In both the Belo and Halli-
burton cases, the employees worked more than the number of hours
guaranteed in some weeks. Whether or not these cases provided
grounds for such a test is arguable, but the Administrator successfully
actually worked in excess of 40." Id. at 42. In Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds
Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945), the Court rejected a contract which provided
for an hourly rate of thirty-five cents with time and one-half for hours worked
over forty, but with a guarantee based on a piece rate of eighty cents per 1000
feet of lumber stacked and seventy cents per 1000 feet of lumber ricked. The
evidence showed the guarantee would in practical effect greatly exceed the stipu-
lated hourly rate. The Court said: "The [Belo] case is no authority however, for
the proposition that the regular rate may be fixed by contract at a point completely
unrelated to the payments actually and normally received each week by the em-
ployees." Id. at 426. In Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945),
a collective bargaining contract with an electrical equipment manufacturer pro-
vided both an hourly rate and job prices. If the job prices exceeded the hourly
rate, which the evidence showed they did 98.5% of the time, the employees were
paid at the job price. Overtime, however, was computed on the basis of the
stipulated hourly rate. The Court held that the bonus derived from the job prices
must be included in determining the regular rate on which overtime was computed.331 U.S. 17 (1947).
1' Ibid. It is interesting to note the language of the Court with reference
to the Belo decision. "Even if we doubted the wisdom of the Belo decision as an
oriinal proposition, we should not be inclined to depart from it at this time."
Id. at 26.
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invoked it in cases in two different courts of appeals;11 however, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a Belo contract where the employees never ex-
ceeded the hours guaranteed, 12 and the Second Circuit upheld such a
contract without reference to the number of workweeks in which the
hours guaranteed were exceeded. 13
The FLSA was extensively amended in 1949,14 and among the
amendments modifying the strict application of section 7(a) was the
provision now found in section 7(e) of the act.15 In substance, this
provision lays down the tests which Congress has established for the
legality of a particular Belo contract. Four separate tests are included,
and all of them must be met if a guaranteed wage contract is to be valid.
First, the duties of the employee must necessitate irregular hours;
second, the arrangement must be based on a bona fide contract; third,
the contract must provide a regular rate not less than the minimum
wage, and at least one and one-half times this rate for all hours over
forty a week; and fourth, the guarantee must cover not more than sixty
hours at the rate specified.
Following the enactment of section 7(e), the Administrator con-
tinued to apply the "substantial number of workweeks" test. His
position was that by use of the phrase "regular rate," this section in-
corporated by implication the "substantial number of workweeks" re-
quirement which had been applied to some "Belo" contracts by judicial
interpretation prior to the 1949 amendments. 16
McComb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co., 165 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1947);
McComb v. Roig, 181 F.2d 726 (lst Cir. 1950). In the latter case, the court
stated: "It is possible, of course, that the relation between the hourly rate and
the guaranty might be set by the employer with reference... to what the employer
supposes would be the maximum possible workweek. In such a case . . . the
workers would never exceed their guarantees, the purported hourly rate would
never control the amount of the wdekly pay and would pretty surely be found
to be fictitious." Id. at 729-30.
12 McComb v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Ass'n, 175 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1949).
"
1McComb v. Utica Knitting Co., 164 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1947).
1" Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, 63 STAT. 910 (1949), 29 U.S.C.§§ 201-08, 211-17 (1952), amending 52 STAT. 1060 (1938).
1Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(e), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952), which provides: "No employer shall be deemed to have
violated subsection [7] (a) by employing any employee for a workweek in excess
of forty hours if such employee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual
contract . .. if the duties of such employee necessitate irregular hours of work,
and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay not less than
the minimum hourly rate provided in section 206(a) of this title and compensation
at not less than one and one-half times such rate for all hours worked in excess
of forty in any workweek, and (2) provides a weekly guarantee of pay for not
more than sixty hours based on the rates so specified."
1" "In order for a contract to qualify as a bona fide contract ... the number of
hours for which pay is guaranteed must bear a reasonable relation to the number
of hours the employee may be expected to work. A guarantee of pay for 60 hours
to an employee whose duties necessitate irregular hours of work which can reason-
ably be expected to range no higher than 50 hours would not qualify as a bona
fide contract under this section. The rate specified in such a contract would be
1958]
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The courts of appeals have consistently rejected the Administrator's
test in all cases which have been decided since the 1949 amendments to
the FLSA. In Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co.1 7 an action was
brought to enjoin the company from violating overtime and record keep-
ing provisions of the act. The case involved employees (meat processors)
of the company who were paid a guaranteed wage based on a fifty hour
week. Although none of the employees ever worked in excess of fifty
hours, the contract was held to be valid. After stating that the FLSA
imposed no inflexible form of contract, the court ruled that the test in
each case is whether the wage rate (for non-overtime work) is "fictitious"
or whether it is in fact the actual rate paid. The "substantial number of
workweeks" test is not mentioned, and section 7(e) is not relied upon
to justify the decision. The court said: "Contracts in which, as in the
present case, the guaranteed compensation is actually predicated upon
and computed by the stipulated wage rate meet all requirements of the
Act. This was true before as it is after the amendment of the Act in
1949 to recognize the validity of such contracts. 18
In Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Khtge, Inc.'0 the First Circuit sum-
marized the judicial history of Belo contracts prior to the 1949 amend-
ments, and said that the passage of section 7(e) means that courts are
no longer "groping in the dark . . . without statutory guidance ...
but rather that "the new § 7(e) enables the courts to make a fresh
start .... ,,21 The court distinguished the case of McComb v. Roig,22
which it had decided in 1950 under the pre-1949 act, where the contract
was held invalid because, among other reasons, it did not comply
with the "substantial number of workweeks" test. The court said that
reading a substantial number of workweeks test into section 7(e) as the
Administrator proposed would be unwarranted judicial legislation.
Mitchell v. Adams,28 pending appeal at the time of the Brandtien
wholly fictitious and therefore would not be a 'regular rate' .... " 29 C.F.R.§ 778.18(f) (1956). See also 29 C.F.R. § 778.18(g) (1956).
"' 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).18 Id. at 238.
"9228 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 940 (1956). Here,
erectors of printing presses were working under a guarantee of a forty-eight hour
week. They exceeded the hours guaranteed in about 3% of the workweeks. The
court upheld the contracts and specifically rejected the contention that although
the contract otherwise qualified, it was still invalid since the employees did not
exceed the hours guaranteed in a "substantial" or "significant" number of work-
weeks. The Administrator's requirement that the guarantee be based on a weekly
"average" was rejected. The court said Congress has chosen not to put the "sub-
stantial number of workweeks" test in the Belo contract section of the act.
Rejecting the Administrator's contention that the workweeks must be averaged,
the court stated that Congress had only restricted the contracts to guarantees of
pay for "not more than sixty hours."
'I1d. at 295. Id. at 296.
" 181 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1950).
2230 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1956).
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decision, was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1956. The result was that
still another circuit rejected the Administrator's test. In the Adams
case a shirt manufacturer made the following contract with some.of his
employees:
The Employer agrees to employ the Employee at a regular hourly
rate of pay at $1.36 per hour for the first 40 hours in any work-
week and at a rate of $2.04 per hour for all hours in excess of
40 in any workweek, with the guarantee that the employee will
receive, in any week in which he performs any work for the
Company, the sum of $95.20 as total compensation, for all work
performed up to and including 60 hours in such workweek.2 4
In this case only one employee during one week worked in excess of
sixty hours during the five years the contracts were in operation. The
Administrator argued that in order to demonstrate good faith and show
that the regular rate of $1.36 was not fictitious it must be actually
put into operation in a "substantial number of workweeks" by having
the sixty hours exceeded. The court said: "But what was mentioned by
the Supreme Court [in the Belo case] as merely specific proof of good
faith . . . the Secretary now turns into an indispensable ingredient of
the contractual operations." 25 And also, "We think this misreads both
the Belo decisional law and the specific 1949 Amendment and is again
the search for the handy, arbitrary rule-of-thumb criteria, displacing
inquiry and deliberative judgment, leaving it all to the wisdom of the
Administrator. ' 26 The court implies that it could decide the case as
it does even without invoking the aid of section 7(e), but cites the
Brandtjen case with approval. There was no request for certiorari
from the Adams decision.
In Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., the
principal case, the Second Circuit, in rejecting the "substantial number
of workweeks" test and sustaining the contracts, summarizes the law
of Belo contracts. First, the court denies the assertion that this test
was established by pre-1949 case law. The court found nothing in either
Belo or Halliburton to substantiate such a test, and although admitting
that two courts of appeals had followed this test prior to the 1949
Amendments, 27 called attention to others which did not follow that
test.28 Second, the court states that judicial interpretation of section
7(e) has been contrary to the Administrator's position, citing the Little
Rock, Brandtjen, and Adams cases discussed above. The court rejects
2, Id. at 528.
2I d. at 530.
26 Id. at 529.
27 See note 11 supra.
" See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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the cases on which the Secretary relied29 (all of them in the district
courts) as being either distinguishable on their facts or erroneously de-
cided. Third, the court interpreted the legislative history of section
7(e) as indicating congressional unwillingness to adopt the test advo-
cated by the Secretary. The court said that Congress had all the con-
flicting views on Belo contracts presented to it in 1949 and bills were
presented which "(1) expressly outlawed guaranteed wage contracts;
(2) permitted their use, but subject to specific limitations including a
'significant number of workweeks' test; (3) permitted their use, without
limitation as to the relation between hours worked and hours guaran-
teed." °30 The court felt that "Congressional adoption of the third alter-
native... suggests ... that it did not intend their [Belo contracts] use
in the manner suggested by the Secretary."3 1 To reinforce its view, the
"' Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954); Tobin
v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 143 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Tobin v. Ewbank
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 23 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 67411 (W.D. Tenn. 1952) ; Tobin
v. Wenatchee Air Service, Inc., 21 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 67019 (E.D. Wash. 1952) ;
Tobin v. Morristown Poultry Co., 21 CCH Lab. Cas. 66798 (E.D. Tenn. 1952);
Tobin v. Aronow, 96 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mont. 1951).
" 235 F.2d at 945.
"
1 Ibid. Recourse to the bills introduced in both houses of Congress reveal that
H.R. 2033, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c) (1949), and S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(c) (1949), .would have outlawed Belo contracts. H.R. 3190, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7(c) 1949, would not have outlawed Belo contracts, but would have made
them meet the specifications of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
In its reference to congressional rejection of a bill that permitted the use of
Belo contracts "subject to certain limitations including a 'significant number of
workweeks' test," the court was probably referring to H.R. 5856, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949), which was introduced by Congressman Lesinski on August 2, 1949.
This bill was cited by appellee in his brief before the Second Circuit at pages 9-11.
Letter from Stuart Rothman, Solicitor of Labor, to J. Halbert Conoly, February
27, 1958.
The Lesinski bill was removed from committee and debated on the floor of the
House. The Lesinski bill provided in part in section 7(c) :
"[I]n the case of an employee in an occupation in which hours of work
necessarily vary from week to week, employed in pursuance of a written con-
tract . . . which expressly provides, in conformity with regulations of the
Secretary-
"(1) a bona fide hourly rate of pay specified and actually used as the
basis on which all compensation . . . is computed;
"(2) a guarantee of compensation to the employee for each hour in
excess of forty worked by him in any workweek, in an amount not less than
one and one-half times such bona fide hourly rate; and
"(3) a specified minimum number of hours (not less than forty and
not more than sixty, and bearing a reasonable relationship to the range
of weekly hours customarily worked in such occupation during a representa-
tive period of time) for which such employee is guaranteed employment
or pay in each workweek at the rates specified in the contract;
nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to require the payment by the em-
ployer to such employee of a greater amount of overtime compensation under
this section than is provided by such written contract."
The Lesinski bill was amended by the Lucas bill, and in place of section 7(c)
above, the provision found in section 7(e) of the present law was passed by the
House. See note 15 supra.
This portion of the 1949 Amendments received very little attention on the
floor of the House. Congressman Combs, speaking on behalf of the Lesinski bill
[Vol. 36
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court applied two guides of statutory construction. First, that the
inclusion of express limitations on the use of Belo contracts in section
7(e) indicates limitations not expressed were not intended, and second,
the inclusion of a requirement in section 7(f) (3) similar to that
advocated by the Secretary in section 7(e) would support a similar in-
ference.3 2  The court in Hartford felt that the legislative history of
section 7(e) indicated that Congress rejected any "substantial number
of workweeks" test.
However, it is difficult to find any clear congressional intent on this
subject. It is doubtful whether Congress was sufficiently concerned
with this issue to either affirm or reject such a test. With the excep-
tion of limiting a Belo contract to a maximum guarantee of sixty hours,
Congress adopted the Belo case as set out by the Supreme Court. This
could indicate that the Congress in general was satisfied with the
judicial interpretations of guaranteed wage contracts. Congress may
have lacked any specific intention to incorporate by implication a "sub-
stantial number of workweeks" test into the FLSA by the use of the
term "regular rate." It would be just as doubtful that Congress in-
tended to authorize a wage contract where the hourly rate was fictitious
and unrealistic. The use of the words "regular rate" in the light of
judicial interpretation would seem to reject any such intention. The bet-
ter reasoning would be that Congress left this question to be determined
by the courts in the light of the earlier cases dealing with Belo con-
tracts.
33
and against the Lucas substitution, said, "The Lesinski bill authorizes the Secretary
to issue regulations setting forth the conditions under which such contracts
may be used, and how they have to work. The Lucas bill ...fails to define
the terms, fails to set real restraints, and fails to authorize the Secretary to issue
regulations." 95 CONG. REc. 11221 (1949). If H.R. 5856, as originally proposed
by Lesinski, is the bill referred to by the court in the Hartford case as incorporating
the "substantial number of workweeks" test, the court's conclusion is open to
the criticism that Congress merely may have refused to allow the Secretary such
broad rule-making authority. Neither H.R. 3190 nor the Lesinski version of H.R.
5856 specifically sets out the "substantial number of workweeks" test.
" The court appears to be applying its rules of construction to a situation
where they are inapplicable. In most of the 1949 amendments to § 7 of the act,
Congress was seeking to deal with problems created by specific decisions. The
amendments sought to adjust § 7 to the realities of the industrial world by per-
mitting wage plans that complied with the spirit of the act if not its technical
language. Since the purpose of § 7(a) would still apply to the exceptions such
as § 7(e), the application of a strict technical construction as in the Hartford-case
is unjustified. Furthermore, the analogy the court attempts to make between
§§ 7(e) and 7(f) (3) is unjustified since § 7(e) was aimed at employees whose
hours of employment were irregular, and § 7(f) (3) was designed for employees
whose hourly rate was subject to unusual fluctuations such as salesmen on salary
and commission.
"' Several articles and publications after the 1949 amendments indicate approval
of the "substantial number of workweeks" test. See Brewer, A "Belo" Primerfor 1950, 1 LAB. L.J. 94 (1949) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 264 (1949) ; LIVN-
GOOD, THE FEDERAL WAGE AND HouR LAw 143 (1952).
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The Second Circuit followed its decision in Hartford when it was
confronted with Mitchell v. Feinberg,34 where a group of delivery men,
working under a collective bargaining contract, was guaranteed a forty-
eight hour week, and the hours worked did not exceed the hours
guaranteed in a substantial number of workweeks. In addition to the
guarantee, the contract provided that one-fifth of the guarantee was to
be deducted for each day the employee missed work during the five-day
week, for any reason other than lack of work. The district court had
held the contract invalid.3 5 The court of appeals in a per curiam opinion
reversed, relying on the Hartford case, and saying with regard to
the one-fifth deduction provision, "It is true that under the Feinberg
contract an employee may receive greater compensation, in terms of
hourly rates, for weeks in which he works four days (or less) than in
weeks in which he works five days. This incident, however, is not
violative of the Act and constitutes, in our judgment, insufficient ground
to differentiate the case from Hartford." The judge who wrote the
Hartford decision concurred in holding that the "substantial number of
workweeks" test was no basis for saying the contract was invalid, but
dissented from the view of the majority that Hartford was a ground
for saying a deduction from the guarantee could be validly made.30
In spite of its rejection by the courts, there is merit in the Admin-
istrator's argument. If the courts are going to approve contracts similar
to those in the Hartford case, the overtime policy of the FLSA is being
defeated. It would seem that any basic or overtime rates specified in
such contracts have no meaning and are completely fictitious. An
attorney for an employer whose employees work irregular hours but
never in excess of sixty could advise the employer to set the maximum
hours covered by the guaranteed wage contract at sixty per week. The
employer could determine a "regular rate" sufficient to guarantee a
weekly wage the employee is willing to accept. It is obvious in such a
case that the specifying of an hourly regular rate is nothing more than
creating an arbitrary figure to satisfy a technical requirement of the
FLSA. The employees will always receive the same amount of pay,
"236 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 943 (1956).
'5 Mitchell v. Feinberg, 123 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
"236 F.2d at 13. "I contend that the Act requires the employer ... to pay the
guaranteed sum in compliance with § 7(e), or ... to pay his employees in accord-
ance with the 'regular rate' specified in the agreement as required by § 7(a) and
reiterated in § 7(e). I reach this conclusion reluctantly because of the obvious
benefits to employees of such a practice as the daily crediting of overtime." The
dissent relied on a pre-amendment case, 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331
U.S. 199 (1947). The idea expressed was that it should be a case of either pay
the guarantee regardless of days missed, or use the regular rate without the over-
time in workweeks of less than forty hours. The act does not permit the payment
of daily overtime, which this contract permits, and this practice would undermine
the "regular rate" language of the act.
[Vol. 36
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exactly as though they were being paid a weekly salary without regard
to an hourly rate.
The courts have consistently rejected Belo wage plans where no
hourly rate is specified or where* the fixed wage is changed without a
corresponding change in the hourly rate. Assume a plan that specified
no hourly rate, but merely guaranteed a fixed wage for sixty hours
work,37 and the employer testified at the trial of the case that neither he
nor the employees felt it necessary to specify any hourly rate since none
of the employees exceeded sixty hours of work per week. If a court
should hold such a contract invalid and yet hold the contract in Hartford
valid, it would in effect be saying that it was looking only to the tech-
nical form of the contract, and not to its substance, since in either situa-
tion the wages paid the employees would be the same. It is difficult to
believe that Congress in enacting section 7(e) intended such a result.
Although the "substantial number of workweeks" test so persistently
advocated by the Administrator has not survived judicial scrutiny,38 it
is submitted that the overtime provisions of the FLSA are being cir-
cumvented by Belo-type contracts where the hours guaranteed are not
exceeded. If the "regular rate" set in these contracts is truly bona fide,
it is difficult to perceive how employers could afford to pay such high
wages for hours not spent on the job. Perhaps this is another reason
why the Administrator looks upon these contracts with a jaundiced eye.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
JAMES F. SMITH
Marriage-Annulment-Doctrine of Relation Back
In October 1952 a widow was entitled to benefits under the Social
Security Act' as the unremarried widow of a deceased wage earner.
These benefits were terminated because of her marriage in June 1954.
In November she filed for annulment on the ground of fraud in that
the husband never intended to consummate the marriage. The husband
" See Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954), where
the district court rejected a purported Belo contract which provided $75.00 for
fifty-three hours work, with no regular rate stated in the contract. The court
said that since no hourly rate was specified in the agreement, the rate alleged by
the defendant was fictitious.
"Although there have been no revisions of the Administrator's Interpretative
Bulletins published since the Hartford and Feinberg decisions, the public is
currently being advised on request that the "substantial number of workweeks"
test is no longer the sole criterion in adjudging the validity of a particular Belo-
type contract, but may be given weight in determining the bona fide nature of
the contract. Interview with Pauline W. Horton, North Carolina Federal Repre-
sentative for the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division of the United
States Department of Labor, February 13, 1958. This position has some support
in the language of the court in the Adams case. See notes 23-26 mcpra.
249 STAT. 623 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
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